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1 Introduction
In examining the Township and Village Enterprise
sector, Bowles and White (1998:266) argued that it
was possible that this sector might retain some of
its distinctiveness in the face of increasing marketi-
sation. However, it was recognised that this might
seem 'unrealistic to those who hold that markets
and capitalism can break down all restraining
"Chinese walls".2 The issues raised here concern
the extent to which 'markets' lead to convergence
and to the weakening, or disappearance, of locally
based production 'systems', in this case in China
rural collective industries.
In this article, we consider this question further but
on a much larger canvas and examine how the phe-
nomenon of globalisation has affected China.
Needless to say, this is a large question to which
only partial answers can be given. Nevertheless it is
important and links to Gordon White's work in
several ways. First, the question raised involves an
analysis of how politics and institutions shape the
effects of globalisation on China; the centrality of
politics in the process of development is therefore
confirmed. Second, we need to analyse the extent
to which globalisation knocks down Chinese walls
and thereby changes the economic, political and
social forces that condition the development
process.
Our aim here will be to do three things. The first is
to specify some of the major dimensions of global-
isation as they affect China. The second is to
analyse the nature of the Chinese walls in more
detail and the third is to provide a more compre-
hensive assessment of the impacts of globalisation
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on industrial labour in China. In attempting this
latter task we pay particular attention to whether
the 'external' pressures and actors adapt to Chinese
structures or vice versa.
2 Globalisation: Big Numbers,
Discernible Pressures
This article focuses on some of the more concrete
aspects of globalisation represented by the quantita-
tive expansion of international economic flows. In
view of space limitations we consider only two of
the major components of such economic flows,
namely, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Even this limited definition of globalisation enables
us to demonstrate that globalisation has led to a set
of discernible pressures being generated that have
specific impacts for the Chinese economy in general
and Chinese labour in particular.
The policy of 'opening up to the outside world' has,
since 1978, had a dramatic effect on trade and for-
eign investment in China. In the immediate pre-
reform period, China's trade to GDP ratio was 10
per cent, one of the lowest in the world. Since then,
the 'open door' policy has led to a rapid change
with China now having a level of trade openness -
a 36 per cent trade to GDP ratio by the mid 1990s
which is comparable to other large developing
countries (World Bank, 1997:6). Much of this
increase in foreign trade was the result of China
becoming a site for the processing of raw materials
and semi-finished goods following changes to
ïmport duties announced in 1984, China's exports
have been dominated by labour-intensive manufac-
tured goods such as textiles, apparel, footwear and
toys, which rely on these imported raw materials,
By 1991, 45 per cent of all exports were made of
these processed exports, a high figure even by East
Asian standards (World Bank, 1997:7). The
imported content of these processed goods aver-
aged 90 per cent of the export value. The share of
these manufactures in China's exports has probably
risen further since? Recent figures also suggest that
imports account for a large share of the value of
exported goods. Zhang and Zheng (1998:4) report
that in foreign-funded enterprises, exports are 127
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per cent of the value of their imports, again indicat-
ing a large reprocessing role.
Much of this trade was undertaken directly by for-
eign firms and joint ventures. However, Chinese
foreign-trade corporations and state-owned enter-
prises were also significantly involved and the links
with the domestic economy were therefore sub-
stantial, although trade is highly concentrated in
the twelve coastal provinces which accounted for
90 per cent of all trade flows (exports plus imports)
in 1997, with Guangdong alone accounting for 41
per cent (EAEP 1999:21) The result has been a
shift in the production from inland to coastal
provinces with the share of the twelve coastal
provinces in GDP rising from 52 per cent in 1980
to 57 per cent in 1995, which has led to increasing
per capita differences between the inland and
coastal provinces.
With respect to FDI, flows to China were minimal
prior to 1978, increased steadily during the 1980s
and exploded in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s
China had become the leading recipient of EDI
among developing countries (accounting for about
40 per cent of total flows to developing countries).
The total value of FDI actually used (as opposed to
total contact value) was a staggering US $219 bil-
lion between 1979-97 with the trend sharply
upwards over this period (Zhang and Zheng,
1998:4). Two features of this FDI flow are worth
noting. One is again its geographical concentration
with twelve coastal provinces and municipalities
accounting for over 90 per cent of all FDI inflows.
The second is the concentration by home country
with the majority coming from overseas Chinese
investors, and 60 per cent from Hong Kong alone
(World Bank, 1997:22).
China's opening up has been a steady process lead-
ing to cumulative changes that have been quite dra-
matic and which affected, albeit unequally, a wide
spectrum of sectors and regions of the Chinese
economy These developments have led to a set of
discernible pressures arising from the dynamics of
global production, which are described briefly
below.4
The category 'other manufactures', which consists Pressures which come from the global financial system
mainly of labour-intensive reprocessed goods, rose to and from the inter-state system (such as the WTO)
between 56-60 per cent of exports in the 1992-97 therefore lie beyond the scope of this paper.
period. See EAEP 1999:22.
2.1 Pressures from the global production
process
From the above discussion of the form that globali-
sation has taken in China, two discernible pressures
emerge from the global production process. One is
simply that the location of employment has
changed, with the coastal provinces requiring large
inflows of labour to satisfy the expansion of global-
market oriented production in general, and the
needs of foreign invested firms in particular. With
respect to foreign-invested enterprises much of this
is located in Guangdong. Thus, globalisation has
led to the need for increased geographical labour
mobility Second, a distinctive feature of Chinese
exports is the high share of processed exports, sug-
gesting that there are strong pressures for the con-
tainment of labour costs and increasing labour
productivity; in short, labour costs are one of the
few costs that can be squeezed to maintain profit
margins, given that import costs are likely to be
subject to less flexibility This provides important
insights into how China has been incorporated into
the global economy, insights which can be better
understood with reference to the analytical tool of
the 'global commodity chain' (see Gereffi 1995).
Buyer-driven commodity chains are those where
brand name retailers play the pivotal role and typi-
cally do not engage in production themselves, but
operate on the basis of sub-contracting to firms in
low-cost countries. This pattern is more typical in
labour-intensive industries such as garments,
footwear, toys, and consumer electronics, which
are, as we have seen, major exports. In China, the
organisation of the production of these goods is
often a 'triangular' one in which the link between
the developed country retailer and the Chinese
workers is mediated by overseas investors, who
supply the capital and organisational skills through
foreign-invested firms.
The pressures on firms are, therefore, to contain
labour costs in industries where the scope for rais-
ing labour productivity through higher education
levels or increased use of sophistïcated technology
is limited. The increases in productivity must come
mainly from increasing the pace and quality of the
work itself. These pressures also operate indirectly
on governments, in that a policy of attracting for-
eign investment requires policies that are attractive
to international capital in terms of limiting labour
demands, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
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Thus, the pressures from globalisation identified
here include those related to the need for increased
labour mobility, both geographically and occupa-
tionally, and those arising from the logic of the
global market where firms may find themselves at
the bottom of global commodity chains positioned
as suppliers of low-cost labour.
3 Chinese Walls: Social Rules,
Institutional Legacies and State
Policies
'Chinese walls' operate at several levels. Firstly, social
rules - formal and informal - play important roles in
conditioning the way in which work is assigned and
rewarded. For our purposes the two most important
social rules structuring the Chinese labour 'market'
are the hukou system and patriarchal ideology. The
residential registration - or hukou - system was
introduced and developed during the 1950s and
1960s, primarily to control the rural-urban labour
flow This system divides the Chinese population
into urban and rural residents, with the movements
of the latter to urban centres controlled, strictly in
the prereform period and much less so since. This
conditions the terms on which the loo million or so
rural residents enter urban labour markets in
response to better economic opportunities.
Not only is access to employment conditioned
through formal social rules such as the hukou system,
there are also underlying informal social rules which
discriminate against those from interior provinces
and against women. The social constructions of 'skill'
and 'appropriateness' of work for different groups of
individuals, as well as the ideological constructions
of gender roles, condition the ways in which access
to paid employment is structured and rewarded. For
migrant women workers, who are typically young
(see Li and Han 1994), this has the potential to result
in significant labour market discrimination, a point
to which we return below
Second, the institutional legacy of state socialism
provides another Chinese wall. The pre-reform sys-
tem embodied an implicit 'social contract' with
urban, industrial workers, according to which they
would receive relatively high rates of wage remuner-
ation, high levels of job security and an extensive
array of benefits linked to their employment in an
enterprise. While wage levels may have been rela-
tively high, wage incentives were typically low, with
wage profiles determined primarily by seniority and
set administratively Jobs were allocated administra-
tively through labour bureaus and power within the
enterprise was exercised by a combination of Party
cadres and managers although managerworker
relations also took on clientelistic forms. State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and urban collectives
were the sole enterprise types. The organisation rep-
resenting workers' interests was the All China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) (except during
the Cultural Revolution when it was disbanded).
The ACFTU role was not that of independent trade
unions but of a 'transmission belt' similar to their
role in other state socialist countries. The nature of
the social contract was thus as Riskin (1995:324)
notes: that 'workers were essentially disenfranchised
in return for economic benefits and security'.
The nature of this social contract has come under
sustained pressure during the reform period with the
introduction of the labour contract system, changes
in the basis of remuneration towards piece rates and
the widening of wage incentives, increased labour
mobility, various mechanisms to permit enterprises
to reorganise and reduce their labour forces, most
notably with the layoffs (xiagang) , which began in the
early 1990s and which have accelerated rapidly since
the mid-1990s, and the reassignment of rights within
the enterprise to increase the power of enterprise
managers. The one institutional continuity between
the pre- and post-reform periods is the maintenance
of the ACFTU's monopoly position, while other parts
of the social contract have been successively revised
and undone. State-owned industry has changed dur-
ing the reform period, although the extent of that
change remains an area of debate for many observers.
For some, the changes noted above have already led
to major changes in the behaviour and work envi-
ronment of state-owned enterprises; others, however,
maintain that state-owned enterprises remain awash
in red ink because of the failure of the reforms to lead
to significant changes in their behaviour. New own-
ership forms, both private and foreign, have been
introduced where previously only state and collective
ownership existed. These new ownership forms
entered an institutional framework which was not
originally designed for them. Thus, the key issues
have been not simply recasting the social contract
with state sector workers, but also dealing with finns
that lay outside of the previous institutional struc-
tures of control and regulation.
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The third area that needs to be considered is the
interests and autonomy of governments. The cen-
tral government - meaning here the central deci-
sion-making bodies, both government and Party
and its implementing ministries - has set the
agenda for the opening of the economy to integra-
tion with the global capitalist economy It has
shaped the extent to which this has been permitted,
directed the geographical and sectoral interaction
wïth the global economy and set national regula-
tions governing the terms on which China has
engaged with the world market.
The consistent thrust of central policy has been a
controlled opening to the outside world and greater
interaction with the global economy While the
rationale for opening up may have changed over
time - from technology imports to competitive
pressures to employment generation - the main
thrust of policy has remained unchanged, with the
attraction of FDI being a critical pillar of economic
policy While China has sought to increase foreign
investment, and has succeeded dramatically in
doing so as indicated above, the central government
has also been concerned to ensure that China has
not simply become a technologically dependent
state. Indeed, since China shares many of the same
features as the classic East Asian 'developmental
state', emphasis on building China's own enter-
prises and industries into capable players on the
international scene has also been a parallel track. It
is the size of China's economy that has allowed both
policies to be followed simultaneously
Local governments - those at the Provincial level and
below - have been fully involved in the attraction of
foreign investment. Characterising the relationship
between local state and international firms has
proven a controversial issue; some argue that the
international forces are dominant and that local state
actors have become an emerging 'comprador class'
compliantly serving their interests. This takes a
somewhat more benign form in Zweig (1995)
'transnational alliances', although the commonality of
interests between local and international forces are
again evident. Zweig's analysis does question how
'dominant' the latter are, a question raised more
strongly in Smart, who argues that, even though for-
eign firms in Southern China have strong links with
the global capitalist economy, 'even in this area,
where it might be expected that capitalism could be
seen as a dominant, external mode of production
penetrating and exploiting Chinese society, capitalist
practices have still been largely operating under the
constraints of a dominant socialist system'
(1995:11). This recalls the 'articulation' debates of
the 1970s and suggests that examining the extent to
which the capitalist global economy penetrates and
dominates the structures of state socialism should be
an additional axis of investigation in the Chinese case.
This points to important 'institutional' issues. At the
policy level, local government officials have strong
pecuniary and career incentives to attract foreign
investment to their locale. Foreign investment con-
tracts offer the potential for personal gain through
the provision of 'services' to the foreign investor and
meet career requirements which continue to be
posed in terms of meeting growth targets (see Gore
1999). Gordon and Li (1997) argue that the behav-
iour of Chinese local governments towards private
(including foreign) firms differs from that of their
counterparts in the transition economies of the for-
mer USSR and Eastern Europe because they face
different incentives. In particular, they argue that
local government revenue in China depends heavily
on the profit taxes and fees levied on new entrants,
with the result that officials have strong incentives
to support the entry of new private firms in their
jurisdictions. These differences between the experi-
ence of transition economies arises from the nature
of tax incentives and, as such, this Chinese wall is a
policy-induced one.
4 The Impacts on Industrial Labour
How have these Chinese walls affected the impact
of global pressures on Chinese industrial workers?
We analyse this under two separate headings. First,
we look at the more traditional economic indicators
of employment: wages and income distribution.
Second, we analyse industrial relations systems.
4.1 Economic outcomes: employment,
wages and distribution
These indicators o! the impact of globalisation on
labour operate at relatively high levels of aggrega-
tion, As such, it is difficult to disentangle 'globalisa-
tion' from 'reform liberalisation' and other
government policies in determining outcomes. The
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approach is more suited to identifying correlations
than establishing causalities.
With respect to employment, official data sources
suffer from numerous problems (see Rawski 1998).
The numbers in formal industrial employment has
expanded at a rate of 3.2 per cent per year over the
past two decades and has risen from 60.9 million in
1978 to 107.6 million in 1997 (see SSB 1998).
Included within these figures is an increase in the
percentage of the labour force that is female. Taking
the period of reform as a whole, therefore, to Lee's
(1996) question 'globalisation and employment: is
anxiety justified?', in China's case one is tempted to
answer 'no'.
However, it should be noted that the output elastic-
ity of employment has been very low, at least in the
state and urban collective sectors where the average
annual rate of employment growth was -0.9 per
cent and -6.0 per cent respectively for the period
199 1-96 despite annual average rates of output
growth of 3.9 per cent and 10.0 per cent respec-
tively China in the 1990s experienced its own ver-
sion of 'jobless growth'. Furthermore,
unemployment has risen substantially. The urban
unemployment rate, including laid-off workers, was
estimated at 9.36 per cent (or around 16 million
workers) in 1997 (see Anon. 1998).
Accompanying the increased formal sector employ-
ment have been rising average real wages. For
industry as a whole, real wages rose by an average
of 4.8 per cent from 1978 to 1996. Certainly, rising
real wages and greater integration into the global
economy seem to have gone together. These two
sets of outcomes - employment growth and real
wage growth - are typically the key outcomes most
often identified by neoclassical economists as affect-
ing workers, and China has therefore been added to
the list of countries with visible benefits of globali-
sation for workers. However, attributing these out-
comes to globalisation rather than to high domestic
investment rates or reform-induced structural
change remains problematic.5
The picture of rising average real wages needs to be
tempered by the fact of wage discrimination against
Results of Granger causality tests indicate that over the employment, whereas exports had no effect on
period 1952-97 domestic investment caused increasing employment but caused rising real wages over this period.
Table 1: Increases in Real Wages and Labour Productivity of Industrial Workers
Source: Computed from SSB, various years.
migrant workers and women. Wage discrimination
against migrant workers is common in many coun-
tries, although it has particular roots in China in
the unique hukou system, which conditions the
terms on which rural migrants enter the urban
labour force. Typically, migrants are given the jobs
that urban residents do not want and are found in
the more arduous and low-paying sectors of the
urban economy (see Zhou Darning 1994; Knight,
Song and Jia 1999). With respect to gender wage
inequality, estimates by Maurer-Fazio, Rawski and
Zhang (1999) suggest that the gender wage gap is
large and increased over the period 1988-94. They
find (1999:79) that 'the wages received by the aver-
age female worker amounted to between 42 and 55
per cent of the comparable figures for male
employees. These observations ... resemble the
unadjusted figures obtained from other East Asian
economies such as Japan and South Korea.' While
care should be taken in using unadjusted figures,
the greater use of the market in rewarding labour
seems, therefore, to have produced the same mag-
nitude of sex-based wage discrimination as found
in other highly patriarchal societies in East Asia.
For women workers, Chinese walls may in fact be
East Asian ceilings.
The existence of wage discrimination raises the
issue of income distribution. While the impact of
faster growth in coastal provinces might have been
expected to ïncrease inequality in the regional dis-
tribution of income, it is notable that income
inequality has significantly increased even within
urban areas. Incomes for workers at different edu-
cational levels have widened (see Cui 1998).
Similar trends in urban-income inequality are
Drawing inferences from comparisons of rates of
labour productivity growth and real wage growth relies
upon certain assumptions. If the marginal product of
labour is greater than or equal to the wage rate, then,
given a fixed labour coefficient and Cobb-Douglas
technology a faster growth in labour productivity
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reported by Khan, Griffin and Riskin (1998:2) who
find that 'between 1988 and 1995 the Gini coeffi-
cient for the distribution of household income per
capita increased from 0.233 to 0.332, or by 42.5
per cent'. Furthermore, they find urban poverty
increased by most measures. This result is troubling
for the supporters of globalisation, since China
comparative advantage is undoubtedly in its vast
pooi of unskilled workers, who might have
expected to have been the major beneficiaries of
globalisation. It seems, however, that even taking
urban residents only, inequality has increased with
the unskilled suffering relative and, in some cases,
absolute declines in income. Laying the blame for
all of this at the door of 'globalisation', as opposed
to economic reform in general or regressive govern-
ment policies, is, as ever, more difficult.
One way that some non-mainstream authors have
analysed the effect of globalisation on distribution is
to look not at the distribution of income between
households, but at the relationship between real
wages and various measures of capital's share of
national income (Veltmeyer, n.d). If globalisation
has changed the balance of power between capital
and labour, then we might expect to find that real
wage increases are increasingly lagging behind - or
even divorced from - changes in labour productiv-
ity Capital is able to extract greater productivity out
of workers, but workers are unable to convert this
into real wage gains.
Can such a trend be identified in China? Table 1
shows the data for average annual real wage
increases and average annual labour productivity
increases for industrial workers:6
implies a widening gap between the marginal product of
labour and the wage rate. Such an intensification of
monopsonist exploitation might occur under
globalisation if the bargaining power of firms is
increased as they face an increasingly 'global' labour
pool.
1978-84 2.1 3.9
1985-90 5.8 2.3
1991-97 12.8 6.0
Labour productivity Real wages
Table 2: Increases in Real Wages and Productivity by Enterprise Type
Note: other refers to stock ownership enterprises, joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned firms.
Figures are obtained from the time trend regressions using the data from State Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
These figures would certainly seem to support the
argument that the period of globalisation has been
accompanied by an increasing tendency for labour
productivity increases to outstrip real wage
increases. However, further disaggregation by sector
does not permit such a clear-cut link with globali-
sation. Disaggregation shows real wage increases in
excess of productivity increases for the SOE sector,
but productivity increases in excess of real wage
increases in the 'other enterprise' category since
1985. However, the big changes are in the produc-
tivitywage relationship in urban collectives and
rural enterprises. It is in these sectors that we see
the emergence of the widest gaps between rates of
labour productivity increase and rates of real wage
increases as shown in Table 2.
These changes may well represent responses by
enterprises to the pressures of increased market
competition, both domestic and international, and,
possibly, to changes in managerial autonomy as
part of the reform process. SOEs appear to have
been insulated from these pressures, but themore
market-oriented domestic sectors display this
trend clearly The fact that enterprises in the 'other'
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compute the figures
for foreign firms only, or for the 'other' category prior to
1985.
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category do not display this trend as clearly, however,
casts doubt on the extent to which 'globalisation' can
be seen as the leading cause, notwithstanding the
imperfect nature of the 'other' category as an indica-
tor of what is happening in foreign firms.
The examination of wage data implies that wages
are, in fact, actually paid. A further feature of the
reform period has been the rise of the phenomenon
of unpaid wages. While workers in other Asian
countries have protested about falling money and
real wages and bonus cuts, as part of the restructur-
ing resulting from the Asian financial crisis, it is
wage arrears which have sparked protests in China.
The phenomenon of unpaid wages requires special
analysis because, as Earle and Sabirianova (1999:3)
note, 'wage arrears are peculiar in that, unlike
[enterprise and taxi arrears, they are virtually
unheard of in market economies'. And yet they have
become routinised in many (although not all) tran-
sitional economies.
Data published by the ACETU (1995-6:348-49)
indicate that wage arrears in Chinese industry are
widespread. Approximately one in six workers was
Labour productivity Real wages
SObs:
1978-84 1.7 3.2
1985-90 2.4 2.9
199 1-96 4.8 6.1
Urban collectives:
1978-84 2.9 4.4
1985-90 3.8 1.0
199 1-96 16.1 4.3
Rural enterprises:
1978-84 5.3 8.7
1985-90 7.9 3.0
199 1-96 24.6 7.6
Other enterprises:
1985-90 8.0 5.4
199 1-96 8.2 5.0
owed wages. Wage arrears are inversely related to
the enterprise's financial situation, although even
firms in good and excellent financial situations had
wages owing to 8-9 per cent of their workers. It
appears that, contrary to the Russian evidence pre-
sented by Earle and Sabirianova (1999), in China
private firms are the worst offenders with SOEs hav-
ing one of the lowest incidences of wage arrears;
joint ventures and foreign-invested firms fell in
between, although much nearer the SOE end.
Similar to the Russian evidence, workers with less
employment security seem to experience higher
incidences of wage arrears. It would seem that wage
arrears are common to all ownership forms and that
foreign firms have adapted to the Chinese institu-
tional context in this respect.
How can we explain the phenomenon of wide-
spread wage arrears? With respect to financial
assets, Bowles and White (1993:139) argued that
'the struggle for resources through bond issue can
by no means be described as a real 'bond market',
meaning the free and voluntary sale and purchase of
bonds. The politico-economic relationships
involved are more complex, with at least three main
aspects: ... coercion ... collusion . . . [and] market.
Such a diversity of relationships falls short of any-
thing that can be called a 'market' and can be
understood as reflecting the dynamics of a partly
reformed and structurally ambiguous economy'.
The phenomenon of wage arrears would appear to
be a new and particularly virulent form of this
politico-economic struggle for resources. This type
of explanation suggests that transitional economies
are, as Earle and Sabirianova argue, distinctive types
of economies which operate in ways quite different
from market economies. This Chinese wall has not
been broken down by the integration into the
global capitalist economy; in fact, conversely it is
foreign firms which quickly adapted their behav-
iour to take advantage of the opportunities offered
by the 'transitional economy'.
4.2 Industrial relations systems
An alternative approach to analysing the impact of
globalisation on Chinese workers is to analyse indus-
trial labour systems. With respect to the operation of
foreign firms in China, it is often here that some of
the worst forms of labour abuse are found, with long
work hours, enforced overtime, authoritarian man-
agementworker relations, physical punishment of
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workers and, in the very worst cases, even death.
Asian foreign invested firms are often identified as
being among the worst offenders of labour rights.
Previous work in this area has tended to stress either
the cultural origins of the foreign investor, or to argue
that home country conditions are important in deter-
mining how firms operate abroad, so that firms from
social democratic Europe or rights-based US tend to
treat workers better than enterprises from countries
with strictly controlled unions such as Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore (see Chan 1998b).
We would agree with the home country conditions'
explanation, but would add to it the importance of
the enterprise's position in the global commodity
chain and the characteristics of that chain. Thus,
foreign investors at the lower levels of buyer-driven
commodity chains have great incentives to lower
labour costs. The attraction of China is precisely its
low paid labour force, and China's incorporation
into the global economy depends crucially on this
feature. The result is continuous pressure to
increase output and reduce unit labour costs by
increasing hours of work and under-paying work-
ers. The increase in the employment of young
unmarried (usually migrant) women workers in the
export processing factories of southern China paral-
lels that found in other developing countries in Asia
and elsewhere. The increase in pay and economic
independence which may accompany such employ-
ment needs to be heavily balanced against the new
forms of control and subordination which are also
typical accompaniments.
However, foreign firms in China do not operate in
an institutional vacuum. For these practices to
occur requires compliance by Chinese govern-
ments. How have they responded to these pres-
sures? The central government has, as we have seen,
been instrumental in setting the policy of attracting
foreign investment as a pillar of policy to modernise
the economy, and has been keen to continue the
flow of resources into the economy However,
examples of worker mistreatment and the open dis-
cussion of 'exploitation' in the Chinese media have
forced the government to act. The new Labour Law
of 1994 was a response to this and has been accom-
panied by an aim to have Trade Unions in all of
China's foreign enterprises and joint ventures. It is
claimed that this has been achieved in about 70-80
per cent of cases, with the Trade Unions being
designed to eliminate the worst cases of abuse but
still controlled by the state to implement pro-reform
policies. The intention has been to extend the tradi-
tional role of the ACFTU as a 'conveyor belt' for
central policy in the state sector into the foreign sec-
tor. Such a trade union is, of course, compromised
by this role in protecting workers' rights and serv-
ing as a vehicle for workers mobilisation.8
Implementation of the labour law has also been, to
say the least, patchy and has been a low priority for
governments at all levels.
The position of migrant workers is perhaps worst
of all. As Chan (1998a:3) notes, 'the household
registration system provides fertile conditions for
the creation of a system of forced and bonded
labour'. In Chan's work on the footwear industry
she has shown that migrant workers, especially in
foreign, joint venture and private firms, are much
more likely to be charged a 'deposit' than other
workers, and this ties them to the enterprise even
in the face of poor working conditions. However,
it is not always the case that it is only foreign
firms that seem to be engaged in the violation of
labour rights. Chan (1998a:6) also reports that
'even in the state sector, the low-skill footwear
industry has begun to employ migrant workers,
and [there appears to be] a transfer of the harsh
labour regime of the foreign Asian managers to
the mainland state and collective sectors'. The
competitive pressures of production for the global
economy seem therefore to have forced many
firms in the footwear industry to adopt more
authoritarian forms of work practices - a clear
example of the race to the bottom in labour stan-
dards that critics of globalisation predict.
Furthermore, ACFTU data indicate that this result
is applicable much more widely than simply the
footwear industry and evidence of violations of
the labour law provisions on the length of the
working week, payment for overtime, and viola-
tions of other labour rights are widespread (see
ACFTU, 1995-96: 357, 358, 390, 391).
While this may be the case for firms operating in
highly competitive labour-intensive manufacturing
In some firms the union representatives are managers
or management appointees. This has led to protests. See
'AFP Reports Workers Protest "Imposed" Union Leaders',
Agence France-Presse, 22 October 1998, in FBIS-CHI-
98-295.
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industries, what is happening elsewhere? Producer-
driven commodity chains are typically more capital
intensive and give firms more market power and
there is thus a greater scope for rent-sharing with
workers, a factor enhanced by the fact that more
capital-intensive firms typically have longer invest-
ment horizons than labour-intensive firms. Data
presented by Zhang and Zheng (1998) show that
MNCs operating in China have higher profit rates
than the average of all foreign- funded firms, have
higher capital per employee, pay higher wages,
have lower export to sales ratios and operate in
more concentrated markets.
It is not surprising to find, therefore, that US,
European and Japanese MNCs operating in China
typically display different labourmanagement
practices than those outlined above. Again, they
have to deal with Chinese institutional settings and
there is evidence that in joint ventures, MNCs often
adopt the practices of SOEs. For example, research
by Goodall and Warner (1997:592) on joint ven-
tures in Beijing and Shanghai between Chinese
firms and partners from the US, Holland,
Switzerland, Germany, Japan and Hong Kong find
that 'the "iron rice bowl" is ... still in evidence and
may be found in foreign-invested joint ventures as
well as many SOEs.' Thus, there is also evidence of
foreign firms adapting to Chinese institutional
frameworks in ways which might, in some but not
all respects, benefit workers.
One other sector to analyse in terms of assessing the
impact of globalisation on labour is China's attempt
to build its own global conglomerates.9 Enterprise
reform in the state-owned sector has, since the early
1990s and most explicitly since the 15th Party
Congress in September 1997, focused on building
large conglomerates to compete internationally The
aristocracy of labour in state-owned enterprise
which included a large proportion of the urban
work-force in the Maoist period will shrink to the
core workers employed in China's new, large glob-
ally focused conglomerates. It is here that the paral-
lels which some scholars have seen with Japanese
employment practices may be evident. As Chan
For more extended discussion see, for example, Nolan
and Wang, 1999.
(1997:202) argues "Socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics' (and even core-sector 'capitalism with
Chinese characteristics') may well end up meaning
an organisation-oriented system akin in many ways
to that of core Japanese industry'.
Whether such an outcome will occur is an open
question. This an area where more research is
needed, but it is important to note that the result of
developing countries 'going global' is not necessar-
ily the adoption of developed country labour rela-
tions systems. To take the example of perhaps the
most global manufacturing industry, that of the
automobile, wide variations in labour-management
relations exist. Thus, Rodgers (1996) in his exami-
nation of the globally successful South Korean auto-
mobile industry, argues that, given institutional
path-dependence, there is little prospect of a transi-
tion to newer - and more worker friendly - pro-
duction methods. He argues that 'as might be
expected in a society where the traditional mass
production model is predominant, government and
business elites do not seem to consider the benefits
of cooperative labour-management relations to be
worth the cost in terms of higher wages or reduced
managerial prerogatives' (1996:110). Similarly,
Deyo account of the Thai auto industry also con-
cludes that workers in developing countries are
unlikely to enjoy the benefits of changing produc-
tion methods that are sometimes identified for their
advanced country counterparts. Instead, 'autocratic
low-trust flexibility may provide an adequate basis
for competitive success in the second-tier technol-
ogy-dependent automotive industries of developing
countries' (1996:152).
In China, the desire to build global conglomerates -
and to create a modern enterprise system more gen-
erally in the state sector - has paid little attention to
what type of industrial relations system might be
required for a 'modern' or 'global' firm. The institu-
tional legacy of state socialism is one where the
social bargain was based on employment stability in
return for state/managerial control of the work-
place; it would seem a difficult transition from this
to a more worker-empowering work-place. Even in
those enterprises which succeed in 'going global',
workers might expect to enjoy greater employment
stability and higher wages than their counterparts
elsewhere in Chinese industry; but 'going global' is
unlikely, in itself, to change the nature of industrial
relations.
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5 Conclusion
This article has argued that the pressures from glob-
alisation have taken clearly discernible forms in
China. These pressures arise from the way in which
China has been incorporated into the global pro-
duction process and are evident in the geographical
mobility of labour, in the pressures for labour-cost
minimisation as a result of the processing trade, and
in the creation of China's own global conglomer-
ates.
The ways in which these pressures have been medi-
ated by 'Chinese walls' have indicated the impor-
tance of contextualising these global pressures with
reference to social rules, such as the hukou system
and patriarchy, the role played by the institutional
legacy of state socialism and the policy choices
made by various levels of government. We have
found examples of phenomena - such as wage
arrears, industrial relations systems in MNC-
Chinese joint ventures, the particular conditions
under which migrant and women workers have
been employed - which point to the importance of
analysing these 'Chinese walls' for understanding
the impact of globalisation on industrial labour.
And yet, while these walls are important, there are
also some striking examples of similar outcomes in
other countries. In many developing countries in
East and Southeast Asia, the balance sheet of global-
isation has been - at least pre-1997 - increased
employment and wages on the positive side of the
ledger, but increased insecurity and deteriorating
working conditions on the negative side (see, for
example, Manning 1993). China is joined by many
other countries in which migrant workers enjoy less
security and worse working conditions than other
workers; many countries have found the enforce-
ment of their labour laws problematic either by
neglect or design; many countries have repressed
organised labour and/or sought to control it under
the auspices of the state; many countries offer lax
labour conditions to attract foreign investment;
many countries have gender discrimination in
employment; and some other countries, noticeably
in East Asia, have sought to sponsor their own global
firms. The Chinese walls may affect some of the
details but the general pattern seems clear: global
pressures are associated with similar outcomes.
Furthermore, the intensification of the pressures on
labour arising from the Asian financial crisis are evi-
dent in China as elsewhere in the region.
This conclusion may seem overly deterministic and
it is necessary to remember that policy choices and
institutional design retain some relevance. Indeed,
this article has argued that institutional factors have
some explanatory power in determining the ways in
which the impacts of globalisation are transmitted in
specific national contexts. This theme has recently
been taken up by economists, with the work of
Rodrik (1999), for example, stressing the impor-
tance of national political and civil institutions in
determining the impacts of globalisation. With his
uncanny ability to identify trends and issues before
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